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STATE EX REL. DAILY MAIL PUB-
LISHING CO., et al. 
Cert tow. va. Sup. 
Ct. (Neely) 
State/Civil Timely 
le SUMMARY: This case poses the question whether West Virginia 
Code § 49-7-3, which forbids the publication in a newspaper of the name 
v 
of any child involved in juvenile court proceedings, creates an imper-
!:./ W.Va. Cod~ § 49-7-3 provides in pertinent part: "[N]or shall the 
name of any child, in connection with any proceedings under this chapter, 
be published in any newspaper without a written order of the court • • • . 
r ~ tk-k ~'M..AN-~~~~ic.J-,'M-~ ~~ -tiu$ ~, MJ-
r W\, ~~~ ~ ~~ '3. r~ 
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missible prior restraint on the freedom , of the press. 
2. FACTS: Petrs are circuit court judges and the prosecuting 
attorney of Kanawha county, West Virginia~ resps are two newspapers and 
several of their employees. 
In February 1978 both newspapers printed stories naming a juvenile 
charged in the fatal shooting of a student at a local junior high school . 
Th~ county prosecuting attorney sought and obtained indictments against 
resps for violating § 49-7-3. Resps brought an original action in the 
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals seeking to prohibit petrs from 
prosecuting them under the statute. Resps argue that the statute consti-
tuted a prior restraint in violation of the West Virginia Constitution. 
The West Virginia court, however, decided to tap the well-developed body 
of federal case law in this area and tested the statute against First 
Amendment standards of the Federal Constitution. Noting that prior 
restraints bear a "heavy presumption" against their constitutional validit::_ 
Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971), the 
court rejected the state's argument that a child's interest in anonymity 
with regard to his youthful transgressions and the~ate's interest in 
assuring him a future free of prejudice were sufficiently compelling to 
uphold the statute. The court found little distinction between this 
case and Oklahoma Publishing co. v. District Court. 1s- L.tJ. ~19 (1977 
which held unconstitutional a state court's injunction against publicati 
in the news media of the name and photograph of an 11 year old boy charg 
in a juvenile proceeding with delinquency by second degree murder. The 
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Virginia court a1so found support in Landmark Communications, Inc. v. 
Virginia, 4~ LIAJ. 1-~ (1978}, which invalidated a statute that 
subjected newspapers to cr~inal sanctions for divulging information 
regarding proceedings before state judicial review commissions. Finally, 
the court found Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohen, 420 u.s. 469 (1975), 
instructive. In that case this Court held a Georgia tort action for 
invasion of privacy grounded upon a newspaper's publication of the name 
of a rape viet~ unconstitutional in spite of the legitimate state 
interest in protecting innocent vict~s from embarrassment. From these 
cases, the West Virginia Supreme Court concluded that § 49-7-3 consti-
tutes a prior restraint on freedom of the press in violation of the 
{_ First Amendment. Accordingly, writs of prohibition issued. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petrs first urge that this Court adopt a balancing 
test employed by the District Court for the Virgin Islands in Virgin 
Islands v. Brodhurst, 285 F.Supp. 831 (DC, Virgin Islands, 1968}, which 
held that the advantages accomplished by a statute shielding the names 
of juvenile offenders justified the l~itation placed upon the press. 
~etrs argue that" in balancing the interests between the freedom of the 
press and the juvenile's interest in anonymity, • clearly the j uvenil· 
interest and the state's interest in protecting the youth outweigh the 
' 
public's right to know." Petn at 13. Petrs characterize Oklahoma 
Publishing co. as holding merely that since the relevant Oklahoma statute 
provided for closed juvenile detention hearings, the press could not 
be enjoined from publishing the name of the juvenile revealed during a 
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"public" proceeding. Landmark Communications, Inc., according to petrs, 
"was not decided on the issue of whether the statute created an im-
permissible prior restraint.N Finally, petrs argue that § 49-7-3 does 
not impose an absolute prohibition on publication of the child's name, 
but rather places the determination whether the name should be publ:i.she.:l 
with the "proper person -- the judge. 
For some reason, resps Daily Gazette and Marsh (one of its 
reporters) go to great length to show that the West Virginia statute is 
not within the obscenity, libel, and defamation exceptions to the free-
dom of press guarantee of the West Virginia constitution. Resps Gazette 
and Marsh also argue that West Virginia cannot constitutionally authorize 
state judges the discretion to grant or deny a newspaper permission to 
publish a juvenile defendant's name. "If a newspaper had to retain an 
attorney to petition a court to schedule a hearing to obtain an order 
approving publication of a juvenile's name every time a juvenile is 
arrested and charge with the commission of a felony in a public place 
certainly a matter which the public in a given locality has a right 
and need to know-- the value of the public's timely receiving this 
information would be lost -- assuming the judge saw fit tog rant the 
order." These resps finally argue that the state interests supporting 
§ 49-7-3 do not justify the prior restraint on First Amendment freedoms • . 
Resp Daily Mail Publishing Co. largely reasserts the reasoning of 
the West Virginia Supreme ~court. 
4. DISCUSSION: In Oklahoma Publishing Co. this Court .held "that 
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the First and Fourteenth Amendments will , not permit a state court to 
prohibit the publication of widely disseminated information obtained at 
court proceedings which were in fact open to the public." 45 U.S.L.W. 
at 3599. The court stressed the public nature of the proceedings: 
"[M]embers of the press were in fact present at the hearing with the 
full knowledge of the presiding · judge, the prosecutor, and the defense 
counsel.~ objection was made to the presence of the press in the 
courtroom or to the photographing of the juvenile as he left the court-
house." Id. Thus, the thrust of Oklahoma Publishing co. would appear 
to be that the state interest in prohibiting publication of already 
public information is insufficient to justify the prior restraint on 
the press. Here, the newspapers acquired the juveniles name through 
independent investigation, and there is no indication that the juveniles 
-------------~ --
name wa~ was likely to become, publicly known. 
In Landmark Communications, Inc., the Court invalidated a Virginia 
statute making it a crime to divulge information regarding proceedings 
before a state judicial review commission that is authorized to hear 
complaints about judges• disability or misconduct. Stressing that a 
major purpose of the First Amendment is to protect the free discussion 
of governmental affairs, including discussion of the operations of courts 
and of judicial conduct, the court concluded that "the publication 
Virginia seeks to punish under its statute lies near the core of the 
First Amendment, and the commonwealth's interests advanced by the im-
position of criminal sanctions are insufficient to justify the actual 
and potential encroachments on freedom .of speech and of the press which 
follow therefrom." 46 U.S.L.W. at 4392. Here, although the names of 
persons accused of crime are of legitimate interest to the public, it 
is not clear that publication of such names "lies near the core of the 
First Amendment." 
v v' 
This Court's decisions in the First Amendment area suggest, but 
seem to 
do not/compel, the conclusion reached by the West Virginia Supreme Court . 
The state maintains that nondisclosure of the names of juvenile defen-
dants is central to its juvenile justice system. The interests advanced 
by the state in support of the statute are hardly insubstantial, and 
this case, which to me is a closer one than the cases cited by the West 
Virginia Supreme Court, seems deserving of serious consideration. 
There are two responses. 
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No. 78-482 Smith v. State 
The Supreme Court of West Virginia invalidated a 
state statute that proscribed the publishing of the name of 
a juvenile in connection with any juvenile proceedings. The 
court relied in major part on Oklahoma Publishing Co. and 
Nebraska Press, holding the statute to be an invalid prior 
restraint. 
The Attorney General of West Virginia, on behalf 
of petitioners, has filed a weak and second-rate brief, 
arguing that the state interest in protecting juveniles from 
publicity and furthering their rehabilitation if found 
guilty of crime, is sufficiently substantial to justify the 
statute, and the imposition of a criminal penalty for its 
violation. 
This case arose when the Charleston Gazette, a 
daily newspaper published in Charleston and owned by 
respondent Daily Mail Publishing Co., deliberately violated 
the statute for the purpose of setting up a test case. It 
ran a story about a 14-year-old student charged with murder, 
. . 




giving his name, and in the same issue ran an editorial 
explaining - in rather juvenile terms (see petr's brief, p. 
3 and 4) why the newspaper was beinq so brave. 
I will give the editor credit for conceding that: 
"Perhaps the decision {to publish the story, 
and revealed the name of the iuvenile] was 
shaded by the urge to report a story, any story, 
as fully as possible." (Underscoring supplied.) 
After running the story and the editorial, the 
newspaper sought a writ of prohibition against the state's 
attorney, and others, to prevent prosecution under the 
statute. 
The statute seems clearly invalid under our 
decisions with respect to prior restraint. Unless I am 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 78-482 
Robert K. Smith, Etc., et al., 
Petitioners, On Writ of Certiorari to the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of 
West Virginia. 
v. 
Daily Mail Publishing Co., 
Etc., et al. 
[May - , 1979] 
MR. CHIEF JusTICE BuRGER delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
We granted certiorari to consider whether a West Virginia 
statute violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the 
United States Constitution by making it a crime for a news-
paper to publish, without the written approval of the juvenile 
court, the name of any youth charged as a juvenile offender. 
(1) 
The challenged West Virginia statute provides : ~ 1~ 
"[N] or shall the name of any child, in connection with \ 
and 
any proceedings under this chapter be published in any 
newspaper without a written order of the court. . . ." 
W.Va. Code§ 49- 7-3. 
"A person who violates ... a provision of this chapter for 
which punishment has not been specifically provided, 
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction 
shall be fined not less than ten nor more than one hundred 
dollars, or confined in jail not less than five days nor 
more than six months, or both such fine and imprison-
ment." ld., at 49- 7- 20. 
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On February 9, 1978, a 15-year-old student was shot and 
killed at Hayes Junior High School in St. Albans, W. Va., a 
small community located about 13 miles outside of Charleston, 
W. Va. The alleged assailant, a 14-year-old classmate, was 
identified by seven different eye witnesses and was arrested 
by police soon after the incident. 
The Charleston Daily Mail and the Charleston Daily Ga-
zette, respondents here, heard about the shooting by monitor~ 
ing routinely the police band radio frequency; they immedi-
ately dispatched reporters and photographers to the Junior 
High School. · The reporters for both papers learned the name 
of the alleged assailant simply by asking various witnesses, the' 
police and an assistant prosecuting attorney who were at the 
school. 
The staffs of both newspapers prepared articles for publi-
cation about the incident. The Daily Mail's first article ap-
peared in its February 9 afternoon edition. The article did 
not mention the alleged attacker's name. · ·The editorial de-
cision to omit the name was made · because of the statutory 
prohibition against publication, without prior court approval. 
The Daily Gazette made a contrary -editorial decision and 
published the juvenile's name and picture in an article about 
the shooting; it appeareq in the February 10· morning edition 
of that paper. In addition, the name of the alleged juvenile 
attacker was broadcast over at least three different radio sta-
tions on February 9 and 10. Since the information had be-
come public knowledge, the Daily -Mail deeided to include 
the juvenile's name in an article in its afternoon paper on 
February 10. 
On March 1, an indictment against the respondents was 
returned by a grand jury; · The indictment alleged that each 
knowingly published the name of a youth involved in a 
juvenile proceeding in violation of W. Va. Code § 49-7-3. 
Respondents then filed an original jurisdiction petition with 
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, seeking a writ 
'18-482-0PINION 
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of prohibition against the prosecuting attorney and the circuit 
court judges of Kanawha County, petitioners here. Respond-
ents alleged that the indictment was based on a statute that 
violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United 
States Constitution and several provisions of the State's con-
stitution and requested an order prohibiting the county offi-
cials from taking any action on the indictment. 
The West Virginia Supreme Court issued the writ of prohi-
bition. Relying on holdings of this Court, it held that the 
statute abridged the freedom of the press. The court reasoned 
that the statute operated as a prior restraint on speech and 
that the State's interest in protecting the identity of the juve-
nile offender did not overcome the heavy presumption against 
the constitutionality of such prior restraints. 
We granted certiorari. -U.S.- (1978). 
(2) 
Respondents urge this Court to hold that because §' 49-7-3 
requires court approval prior to publication of the juvenile's 
name it operates as a "prior restraint" on speech? See Ne-
bra.ska Press Association; v. Stuart, 427 U. S. 539 (1976); 
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); 
Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U. S. 415 
(1971); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
As such, respondents argue, the statute bears "a 'heavy pre-
sumption' against its constitutional validity." Organization 
for a Better Austin, supra, at 419. They claim that the State's 
interest in the anonymity of a juvenile offender is not sufficient 
to overcome that presumption. 
Petitioners do not dispute that the statute amounts to a prior 
restraint on speech. Rather, they take the view that even if 
1 Respondents do not argue that the statute is a prior rei:itraint because 
it imposes a rriminal sanction for certain types of publication. At page 
11 of their bri<>f they sta.te, "The stM.ut<> in question is, to be sure, not a 
prior re:;traint b<•cau:sr it ,;ubjcct.,; newspap<>rs to criminal punishments 
for wlmt tlwy print " after tlw event. 
78-482-0PINION 
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it is a prior restraint the statute is constitutional because of the 
significance of the State's interest in protecting the identity of 
juveniles. 
(3) 
The resolution of this case does not turn on whether the sta-
tutory grant of authority to the juvenile judge to permit pub-
lication of the juvenile's name is, in and of itself, a prior re-
straint. First Amendment protection reaches beyond prior 
restraints, Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 
U. S. 829 (1978); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 
469 ( 1975) , and respondents acknowledge that the statutory 
provision for court approval of disclosure actually may have a 
less offensive effect on freedom of the press than a total ban 
on the publication of the child's name. 
Whether we view the statute as a prior restraint or as a 
penal sanction for publishing lawfu1ly obtained, truthful in-
formation is not disposition; each action calls for the highest 
form of state interest to sustain its validity. The focus in a 
prior restraint case differs because the types of state interests 
that warrant such restraints have been very narrowly re-
stricted to justifications such as national security or protection 
of the Sixth Amendment rights of a criminal defendant. See 
Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, supra, at 716; Nebraska 
Press Association v. Stuart , supra, at 561. See also South-
eastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U. S. 546 (1975). 
However, even though the interests that may support a state's 
effort to punish publication ha.ve not been so narrowly limited as 
to subject, the state must nevertheless show that its punitive 
action was necessary to further the interests asserted. Land-
mark Communications, Inc., supra, at 843. 
Our recent decisions demonstrate that state action to punish 
the publication of truthful information seldom can satisfy 
constitutional standards. In Landmark Communications, 
Inc. v. Virginia, we declared unconstitutional a Virginia statute 
making it a crime to publish information regarding confidential' 
78-482-0PINION 
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proceedings before a state judicial review commission that 
heard complaints as to state court judges' disabilities and 
misconduct. In declaring that statute unconstitutional, we 
concluded : 
"[T]he publication Virginia seeks to punish under its 
statute lies near the core of the First Amendment, and 
the Commonwealth's interests advanced by the imposi-
tion of criminal sanctions are insufficient to justify the 
actual and potential encroachments on freedom of speech 
and of the press which follow therefrom." I d., at 838. 
In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, supra, we held that 
damages could not be recovered against a newspaper for 
publishing the name of a rape victim. The suit had been 
based on a state statute that made it a crime to publish 
the name of the victim; the purpose of the statute was 
to protect the privacy right of the individual and the family. 
The name of the victim had become known to the public 
through official court records dealing with the trial of the 
rapist. In declaring the statute unconstitutional, the Court, 
speaking through MR. JusTICE WHITE, reasoned : 
"By placing the information in the public domain on 
official court records, the State must be presumed to have 
concluded that the public interest was thereby being 
served ... the States may not impose sanctions on the 
publication of truthful information contained in official 
court records open to public inspection." I d. , at 495. 
One case that involved a true prior restraint is relevant to 
our inquiry. In · Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District CCYUrt, 
430 U.S. 308 (1976), we struck down a state court injunction 
prohibiting the news media from publishing the name or 
photograph of an 11-ycar-old boy who was being tried before 
a juvenile court. The juvenile judge had permitted reporters 
and other members of the public to attend a hearing in the 
78-482-0PINION 
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case, notwithstanding a state statute closing such trials to the 
public. The court then attempted to halt publica.tion of the 
information obtained from that hearing. We held that once 
the truthful information was "publicly revealed" or "in the 
public domain" the court could not constitutionally restrain 
its dissemination .. 
None of these opinions directly controls this case; how-
ever, all suggest strongly that if a newspaper lawfully obtains 
truthful information about a matter of public significance 
then state officials may not constitutionally halt or punish 
publication of the information, absent a need to further a 
state interest of the highest order. These cases involved 
situations where the government itself provided or made pos-
sible press access to the information. That factor is not 
controlling. Here respondents relied upon routine newspaper 
reporting techniques to ascertain the identity of the alleged 
assailant. A free press cannot be made to rely upon the will-
ingness of government to provide information on matters of 
public significance which the public has a right to know. See 
Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U. S. 1, 11 (1978) (plurality 
opinion); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972). If 
the information is lawfully obtained, as it was here, the state 
may not publish its publication except when necessary to 
further an interest more substantial than is present here. 
(4) 
The sole interest advanced by the State to justify its crimi-
nal statute is to protect the anonymity of the juvenile offender. 
It is asserted that confidentiality will further his rehabilita-
tion because publication of the name may encourage further 
antisocial conduct and also may cause the juvenile to lose 
future employment or suffer other consequences for this single 
offense. In Davis v. Alaska, 415 U. S. 308 (1974), similar 
arguments were advanced by the State to justify not per-
mitting a criminal defendant to impeach a prosecution wit-
' 
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ness on the basis of his juvenile record. We said there that 
" [ w] e do not and need not challenge the State's interest as a 
matter of policy in the administration of criminal justice to 
seek to preserve the anonymity of. a juvenile offender." Id., 
at 319. However, we concluded that the State's policy must 
be subordinated to the defendant's Sixth Amendment right 
of confrontation. Ibid. The values embodied in the First 
Amendment are generally equal in importance to those rights 
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. See Nebraska Press 
Association v. Stuart, 427 U. S. 539, 561. The reasoning of 
Davis that the constitutional right must prevail over the 
state's interest in protecting juveniles applies with equal force 
here. 
The magnitude of the State's interest in this statute is not 
sufficient to overcome the presumptive invalidity of a re-
straint or to justify application of a criminal penalty to re-
spondents. Moreover, the statute's approach does not satisfy 
constitutional requirements. The statute does not restrict 
the electronic media or any form of publication, except "news-
papers," from printing ~he names of youths charged in a 
juvenile proceeding. In this very case, three radio stations 
announced the a.lleged assailant's name before the Daily Mail 
decided to publish it. · Thus, even assuming the statute served 
a state interest of the highest order, the means of accom-
plishing that purpose are insufficient. 
In addition, there is no evidence to demonstrate that the 
imposition of criminal penalties is necessary to protect the 
confidentiality of juvenile proceedings. As Respondents Brief 
points out at page 29 n. **, all 50 states have statutes that 
provide in some way for confidentiality, but only five, includ-
ing West Virginia/ impose criminal penalties on nonparties 
for publication of the identity of the juvenile. Although 
every state has asserted a similar interest, all but a handful 
2 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-1-107 (6); Ga. Code § 24A-:-3503 (g) (1); N. H. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 169:27-28 ; S. C. Olde § 14-21-30. 
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have found other ways of accomplishing the objective. See 
Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, supra, at 843.3 
(5) 
Our holding in this case is narrow. There is no issue 
before us of unlawful press access to confiqential judical pro-
ceedings, see Cox Broadcasting, supra, at 496 n. 26; there is 
no issue here of privacy or pretrial prejudipe. At issue is 
simply the power of a state to punish the truthful publication 
of an alleged juvenile delinquent's name lawfully obtained by 
the newpaper.4 The asserted state interest cannot justify the 
statute's imposition of criminal sanctions on this type of pub-
lication. Accordingly, the judgment of the West Virginia 
Supreme Court of Appeals is 
Affirmed. 
MR. JusTICE PowELL took no part in the considera.tion or 
decision of this case. 
a The approach advocated by the National Council of Juvenile Court 
Judges is based on cooperation between juvenile court personnel and news-
paper editors. It is suggested that if the courts make clear their purpose 
and methods then the press will exercise discretion and generally decline 
to publish the juvenile's name without some prior copsultatjon with the 
juvenile court judge. See Riederer, Secrecy or Privacy; Communication 
Problems in the Juvenile Court Field, 17 J. Mo. Bar 66, 69-70 (1961); 
Conway, Publicizing the Juvenile Court: A Public Responsibility, 16 Juv. 
Ct. Judges J. 21-22 (1965). 
4 In light of our disposition of the First and Fourteenth Amendment 
issue, we need not reach respondents' claim that the statute, by being 
applicable only to newspapers but not other forms of journalistjc expres-
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